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ABSTRACT 
In assessing fisheries, effort information can often be a limiting factor. This is true of well documented legal fishing fleets, and 
even more so of illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fleets. We studied the insular Colombian Caribbean spiny lobster fishery 
to see if economic conditions have influenced fishing effort in the observed fleet. We have catch per unit effort data from the diver- 
and trap-based industrial fishing vessels with Colombian permits spanning a period of light fishing, expansion, stock collapse, and 
recent signs of rebuilding. Economic data were available on the costs of fishing and expected revenues over the past 15 years. We 
performed a regression analysis of various measures of fishing effort on expected costs of fishing and on expected revenue per unit 
effort. Effort measures included annual participation (a binary variable), trips per season, and days per trip. Expected costs of fishing 
were calculated by accounting for a wide range of factors, but fuel price drove annual variability. Expected revenues per unit effort 
were determined by multiplying the price of lobster by last season’s fleet-specific catch per unit effort, both of which varied from 
year to year. Our results indicate that boats were more likely to participate and take more trips per year when fishing costs were 
lower and expected revenue per unit effort were higher. Trips were also longer when costs were lower. Our results imply that 
economic conditions may be crucial in determining fishing pressure, and provide insight for better modeling of IUU fishing. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In textbook form, assessment models present a simplified view of a fishery, in which science dictates management 
measures and these measures motivate compliance. While most scientists with any real-world experience will admit to 
frequent gaps between science and management, both of these links are tenuous. A more realistic view of a fishery treats it 
as a system that includes ecological dynamics, which are beyond our direct control; human nature in the form of personal 
and social incentives, which are also beyond our control; and a management system, which is our best attempt at control. 
Failures in the motivation of compliance can lead to illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing activities. This paper 
uses a stock assessment combined with economic analyses to examine IUU fishing. It asks two fundamental questions: 
i) How much control do we have over fisheries? 
ii) Can we improve assessments by using economic variables to estimate IUU fishing pressure? 
 
Colombia's insular fishery for Caribbean spiny lobster (Panulirus argus) provided us with a particularly useful chance 
to study economic incentives and IUU fishing. For the San Andrés archipelago, also known as the Seaflower Biosphere 
Reserve, the spiny lobster is the largest fishery, valued at over six billion COP of legal product annually, and represents the 
only major export from this region. It also has an important local cultural history (Shacochis 1985). As with other Colombi-
an fisheries, this one is managed through annual quotas, size limits, and closed seasons and areas. However, enforcement is 
made difficult by the remoteness of the fishing grounds, which also increase the cost of fishing due to heavy fuel consump-
tion. The high value of the fishery, combined with proximity of fishing grounds to Nicaragua and Honduras, creates conflict 
and persistent unpermitted fishing, which further undermine enforcement and compliance. 
 
METHODS 
We first assessed the health of the Seaflower Biosphere Reserve’s spiny lobster fishery in 2006, and revised the 
assessment each year from 2008 – 2012. These assessment efforts relied primarily on estimated catches and abundance 
indices calculated from the catch-per-unit-effort of the two main fishing sectors: dive boats and trap boats. There is also 
limited size information available, but not enough to build into the assessment model. 
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Catch Data 
Artisanal landings since 2004 were compiled from 
user’s monthly and annual trip reports, which list the name 
and location of the fisher. Reports were compared against 
independent landings surveys conducted by the Secretaría 
de Agricultura y Pesca. Data prior to 2004 were obtained 
from compilation of historical trade certificates integrated 
into a database (Prada et al. 2009, Prada and Castro In 
press). 
These artisanal catch data were summed to produce 
annual landings measured in kg of lobster tails by year, all 
of which were assumed to have been collected by divers. 
From 1996 to 2010 industrial boats that had misreported 
their landings as artisanal were identified using historical 
records and local knowledge. For these boats, as well a few 
we could not identify as legitimate artisanal vessels, we 
created a new landings category: misreported industrial. 
These landings were scaled up by 25% to account for non-
reporting. While legitimate artisanal landings were 
assumed to come from divers, the misreported industrial 
landings were split among diver and trap fleets based on 
the proportional contribution of each to industrial catches 
in that year. Artisanal reports were missing in 1982 and 
from 1985 – 1991. These gaps were filled by averaging the 
two previous and two subsequent years and extrapolating 
linearly between them. 
Industrial landings were compiled from a similar 
source as described for artisanal fishers. Since 2004 
technicians have verified all landings when they enter the 
processing plant. Thus, in most cases there were agree-
ments between the two industrial data sources. Previous 
years were obtained from compilation of historical annual 
trip reports integrated into the same database and validated 
against export certificates (Prada et al. 2009, Prada and 
Castro, In press). 
The industrial catches were expressed in kg of lobster 
tails and summed by year and gear (diver or trap). Land-
ings that were reported without identification of a gear type 
were split among diver and trap fleets based on the 
proportional contribution of each to reported industrial 
catches in that year. 
Non-authorized foreign vessels fish in this area despite 
Colombian prohibitions, and their catches go unreported. 
To produce an initial estimate of these catches, we used 
data from four impounded vessels. Three of these vessels 
collectively contained 14,030 kg of lobster tails. The 
fourth, impounded in 2011, had only been fishing for half a 
month and had 2,077 kg of lobster tail. We assumed this 
boat would have doubled its catch had it not been im-
pounded, so the four boats would have had a total of 
18,184 kg, for an average of 4,546 kg per trip per vessel. 
We assumed that half of this catch came from Colombian 
waters, the focus of this assessment. Based on interviews 
of air force personnel and local boat captains, it was further 
assumed that around five illegal fishing vessels made 
monthly trips during open season (12 months through 
2003, nine months from 2004 onwards) through 2007. 
Starting in 2008, we assumed a 40% increase in illegal 
fishing operations because the Nicaraguan government 
made public claims to the northern archipelago and began 
impounding Colombian vessels, while the Colombian 
government attempted to avoid conflict by ending their 
own enforcement of illegal fishing by Nicaraguan vessels. 
Prior to 2000, these boats lacked basic technologies, 
particularly outboard motors on launch vessels and GPS. 
Therefore, it was assumed that illegal foreign catches 
caught a third of values from 2000 onwards. Our long-term 
goal is to use the results of this study to improve upon 
these estimates. 
We explored the effect of many of these assumptions 
through sensitivity analyses. For instance, the model was 
run with assumptions of three and seven illegal fishing 
vessels, and with an increase of 0 or 80% in illegal fishing 
by foreign vessels since 2008. A final sensitivity analysis 
explored a recent regulation change. In mid-2007, diving 
for lobsters on industrial boats was prohibited for the entire 
Biosphere Reserve. However, the trip data suggested that 
some industrial diving might still take place. Consequently, 
the final sensitivity analysis reclassified trips from late 
2007 onwards as dive trips if the boat had a history of dive 
fishing and the crew was primarily from Colombia (trap 
boats tend to work more with Nicaraguans). 
 
Effort Data 
The industrial landings data were accompanied by 
measures of fishing effort. For most trips, we had a 
measure of the days fished separate from travel time. If not, 
we assumed it was one day less than the total days at sea. 
For dive trips, we multiplied the days fished by the number 
of divers. We also scaled effective effort down by 2/3 prior 
to 1996 to account for a lack of outboard motors and GPS 
(these technologies were adopted by Colombian fleets 
before Nicaraguan fleets), and the lack of outboard 
engines. The effectiveness of trap effort was assumed to 
increase at 2% per year to account for better technologies 
over time. A similar factor accounted for increased 
experience among captains over the development of the 
fishery. To model gains from experience, we modeled 
relative effort using an effort multiplier, K, from the 
formula: 
 
 
 
 
 
where Y is the year. This formula was developed in direct 
consultation with experienced lobster captains and results 
in a first-year increase in effective effort of 2.5%, decreas-
ing to under 1.5% in the last years of our series. Captains 
have also increased the number of traps hauled up to 2000 
and kept constant since then (Prada et al. 2009). We 
accounted for this trend by determining the average 
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number of trap lines used each year (available from 
logbooks, not landings reports) and including this as an 
effort multiplier. 
Catch per unit effort was then calculated per trip and 
averaged to produce an index of abundance. No standardi-
zation was possible given a paucity of data on other 
factors. There was the option to develop a separate trap 
index from the logbook data. This index did not correlate 
with any possible explanatory variables, so index values 
were simply the annual means. Further weaknesses were 
that these data vary by two orders of magnitude in extent 
each year and only extend from 1993 to 2005. Consequent-
ly, they were used only as a sensitivity analysis. Other 
sensitivity analyses included varying the trap technology 
effect (0% increase, 4% increase), and the influence of 
outboards and GPS on diving effectiveness starting in 1997 
(no change from before, a doubling of previous effort). 
 
Economic Analyses 
We examined economic incentives to fish and their 
correlation with fishing effort. At this point, our results are 
preliminary but have the potential to guide estimates of 
unreported illegal fishing, any future effort to limit the 
number of licenses, and identification of economic 
conditions that might warrant the need for stricter regula-
tions. 
In this analysis, various measures of effort were 
regressed on the expected revenue (in US dollars) per unit 
effort ($PUE) and the expected costs of fishing. Effort 
measures included a binary variable for participation in a 
given year, an integer measure of the number of trips taken 
per year for active boats, and a measure of the length of 
each trip in days. Lobster prices were found in the Urner 
Barry database. We used the average price from May of 
that year. Expected revenue per unit effort was the product 
of this price and catch per diver or trap per day from the 
previous year (assuming the expectation of catch per unit 
effort was the fleet average from the past year). Finally, 
costs were modeled taking into account engine size as a 
function of fuel use, fuel price, and costs of oil, administra-
tive fees, maintenance, traps or divers, and crew and food. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Surplus Production Model 
The data showed some clear signals of a fishery that 
started with high stock abundance, was fished down, and 
has recently rebuilt. Catches increased gradually through 
the 1980s and dramatically through the 1990s before 
declining through the current decade, with a slight increase 
in the most recent years (Figre 1a). Overall landings were 
dominated by industrial catches, which also drove the 
patterns of increase and decline. Note that catches seem to 
be unaffected by the annual quota. In most years, the 
Colombian fleet failed to reach the quota, even when it was 
increased in the late 2000s. However, the quota also failed 
to limit catches in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when 
catches exceeded quotas. Indices of abundance showed 
generally consistent trends of high but volatile early values, 
steep declines in the 1990s, and recent signs of recovery 
(Figure 1b). 
Figure 1. Catches and Relative Abundance Through Time. A. Catches. Note the 
black line, which represents quotas over time. Other elements are identified in the 
legend. B. Abundance. Fleet-specific catch per unit effort series, which were stand-
ardized to average 1 over time. 
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Surplus production models contain few free parame-
ters. Their rigid structure assumes a constant relationship 
between biomass and surplus production. As such, they 
have a difficult time fitting data when catches and 
abundance indices trend in the same direction. This pattern 
is encountered surprisingly often, most likely because the 
fishery data span a relatively short timeframe and a 
homogeneous set of conditions. In these circumstances, 
natural variability can swamp patterns driven by changes 
in biomass and production. 
Unlike most simple assessments, the data for spiny 
lobster were consistent with a surplus production model. 
Catches increased during the late 1980s and 1990s while 
indices of abundance dropped, and indices of abundance 
have increased in recent years following reductions in 
catches. This consistency is most likely a result of a data 
series that started before the explosive growth of the 
fishery but may also be an indication of strong local 
recruitment patterns. As a result of the data consistencies, 
all model runs converged on parameter estimates quickly 
and without problems of multiple local optima. 
The model estimated that the population started at near 
pristine condition (pristine occurs at a biomass ratio of 2) 
in the early data years, declined rapidly in the late 1990s, 
and rebounded in recent years when fishing pressure was 
light (Figure 2). The results suggest that the fishery 
experienced overfishing (a fishing mortality rate above 
FMSY, the rate that would produce maximum sustainable 
yields (MSY)) for most of the past decade, and that the 
stock dropped below BMSY, the biomass level that could 
sustain MSY catches in equilibrium. The model estimated 
that fishing pressure recently dropped below FMSY and 
allowed the stock to rebuild above BMSY, so that the fishery 
now appears to be healthy. The model estimated that the 
fishery is capable of an MSY of 328 metric tons, of which 
185 mt would be available to Colombians after accounting 
for estimated levels of illegal foreign fishing. 
 
Economic Analyses 
Prices varied a great deal over the past 15 years. 
Whereas the price paid per pound of lobster increased 
gradually until 2008 and then dropped precipitously with 
the world recession, fuel prices have risen for the most part 
since 2000 (Figure 3). The result has been increasingly 
hostile economic conditions for the lobster fishing fleets. 
Regression analyses revealed a strong link between 
incentives to fish and fishing effort. For industrial trap 
boats, fishers were more likely to participate in a given 
year, and participants made more trips in a year, if 
expected revenues per unit effort ($PUE) were high and 
expected costs were low (see Table 1). For both trap and 
dive boats, days per trip were significantly correlated with 
the expected costs of fishing. However, whereas higher 
cost expectations were associated with shorter trips in the 
trap fishery, they were associated with longer trips in the 
dive fishery. In general, the results showed higher effort 
with more expected revenues and less expected costs (as 
suggested by Figure 4). This finding supports the idea that 
this fishery is limited by economic conditions and makes 
plausible the ability to estimate past IUU fishing effort and 
predict future fishing effort by legal and illegal vessels 
from the prices of lobster and fuel. 
Figure 2. Assessment Results. Based on the available data, the model estimated 
that the stock started in near-pristine condition, declined into overfished status over 
the late 1990s, and rebounded in the late 2000s. 
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Figure 3. Economic Variables. Over the past 15 years, the price of 
fuel has increased relative to the price of lobster, making fishing less 
economical. 
Figure 4. Economic Effects on Effort. As prices became less favorable 
for fishermen, represented here as the ratio of the lobster to fuel price, 
participation and number of trips per participant both declined. 
Table 1. Economic Regression Results. Parameter values of interest are indicated in bold font. p-values marked with ** are 
statistically different from 0 with 95% confidence. 
  $PUE parameter p-value Cost parameter p-value Intercept p-value 
TRAPS             
Annual participation 1.04 0.029** -1.17e-5 0.025** 0.869 0.14 
Trips/year 1.23 <0.0001** -1.37e-5 <0.0001** 4.63 <0.0001** 
Days/trip 0.114 0.12 -1.14e-5 <0.0001** 57.9 <0.0001** 
              
DIVERS             
Annual participation 
-0.038 0.65 7.23e-6 0.45 -1.97 0.016** 
Trips/year -0.0763 0.34 -6.73e-6 0.47 7.05 <0.0001** 
Days/trip -0.0166 0.91 7.15e-6 0.0024** 20.2 <0.0001** 
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DISCUSSION 
These results provide a number of notable observations 
and implications for fisheries science and management. 
First, they indicate that, at least in this fishery, the annual 
quota does not effectively control catches legal catches. 
The scale of unpermitted foreign fishing only emphasizes 
this point. Though conventional wisdom would lead us to 
predict a history of overages, the reality is that this fishery 
rarely meets the quota. It is of concern, however, that over-
ages do occur when fishing is good. Note that the Colombi-
an government does consider catches by foreign vessels 
when establishing the annual quota and so the expectation 
is that the quota would apply to the Colombian fleet alone. 
Second, the results indicate that economic conditions 
have a great deal of influence over fishing effort. In the 
industrial trap fishery, where data was most complete, a 
unit increase in $PUE was associated with a 4.75% increase 
in participation, and 1.2 more trips annually for each partic-
ipating boat. A unit increase in the cost per gallon of gas 
was associated with a 2.68% drop in participation and 0.68 
fewer trips annual for each participating boat. In combina-
tion, the large fluctuations in expected lobster revenue and 
fishing costs were strongly linked with reduced fishing ef-
fort during the world recession of the late 2000s. It was 
during this time that the fishery recovered, suggesting that 
economic conditions may be responsible for the current 
health of Colombia’s Caribbean spiny lobster fishery. 
Though unusual in the remoteness of fishing grounds, 
this is not the only fishery where fuel prices and market 
demand may influence effort. Some fisheries have had re-
cent drop in prices as a result of competition from cultured 
versions (e.g., salmon, shrimp) and gas prices remain a 
major contributor to the costs of fishing for many fisheries. 
In cases where market prices for fish are volatile and where 
fuel costs are a major portion of budget, we should consider 
that economic conditions may be playing a role in control-
ling a fishery, thus creating the potential for uncontrolled 
growth if economic conditions improve. 
On the plus side, this technique suggests we may be 
able to predict effort based in some fisheries based on a 
couple of simple prices. This ability would help us with 
more accurately estimating IUU fishing and thus more ac-
curately assessing stocks. It also offers the potential to pre-
dict regulatory needs early on in a fishing season. Further 
research will help to develop tools to take advantage of this 
improved understanding. 
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